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ABSTRACT
Several recent studies have found that earnings inequality in Canada has grown considerably since
the late 1970's. Using an extraordinary data base drawn from longitudinal income tax records, we
decompose this growth in earnings inequality into its persistent and transitory components. We find that the
growth in earnings inequality reflects both an increase in long-run inequality and an increase in earnings
instability. The large size of our earnings panel allows us to estimate and test richer models of earnings
dynamics  than could be supported by the relatively small panel surveys used in U.S. research.  The
Canadian data strongly reject several restrictions commonly imposed in the U.S. literature, and they also
suggest that imposing these evidently false restrictions may lead to distorted inferences about earnings
dynamics and inequality trends.
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I. Introduction
Scores of studies have documented the growth of earnings inequality in developed
Western economies since the late 1970's. Although a large proportion of this literature has
focused on the United States,' numerous studies have examined changes in Canada's earnings
distribution.2 The Canadian studies do not agree in every detail, but by and large they indicate
that earnings inequality has increased substantially, though perhaps not quite as dramatically as in
the United States. They also fmd that the return to education in Canada, unlike the return in the
United States, has increased little if at all. That is, the increase in Canadian earnings inequality has
occurred mainly within education groups, rather than between them. Another contrast with the
United States is that a larger share of Canada's growth in annual earnings inequality has arisen
from increased dispersion in annual work hours rather than in hourly wage rates.
A few recent U.S. studies (Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1994; Moffitt and Gottschalk, 1995;
Buchinsky and Hunt, 1996; Gittleman and Joyce, 1996; Haider, 1998) have stressed the
importance of decomposing the growth in earnings inequality into persistent and transitory
components. On one hand, if the increase in earnings inequality has been driven mainly by a rise
in returns to education and other persistent worker attributes, then the observed increase in cross-
sectional inequality signifies increased inequality in long-run earnings. In this scenario, the
'See, for example, Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), and
the survey article by Katz and Autor (forthcoming).
2
See,for example, Bar-Or, Burbridge, Magee, and Robb (1995), Beach, Slotsve, and Vaillancourt (1996), Beaudry
and Green (1997), Blackburn and Bloom (1993), Davis (1992), DiNardo and Lemieux (1997), Freeman and
Needels (1993), Gottschalk (1993), Morissette and Berube. (1996), Picot (1996), and Richardson (1997).chronically rich have gotten richer and the chronically poor poorer. On the other hand, if the
increase in cross-sectional inequality has been driven mainly by a rise in the transitory component
of earnings variation, then long-run inequality may have increased very little. In this scenario, the
chronically rich have not gotten richer in the long run, and the chronically poor have not gotten
poorer, but there has been an increase in year-to-year "churning" through the ranks of the annual
earnings distribution.3 As it turns out, the message of the U.S. studies is that both components of
earnings inequality have increased. In Haider's words, "annual inequality increased because of
fairly equal increases of a persistent component and an instability component."4
In this paper we make two contributions to the literature on earnings dynamics and
inequality trends. First, using almost two decades of longitudinal earnings information drawn
from income tax records, we decompose Canada's growth in earnings inequality into persistent
and transitory components. To what extent does Canada's increasing inequality reflect greater
year-to-year earnings fluctuation, and to what extent does it arise from an increased dispersion in
permanent earnings? Given the integration of the U.S. and Canadian economies, one might
expect to fmd the same answer as in the U.S. literature. The rise in long-run inequality in the
United States, however, has been tied to a large increase in the return to education, which has not
taken place in Canada. The Canadian experience need not be the same as the U.S. experience,
and any similarities and differences can be instructive about labor market developments in both
countries (as well as in other parts of the world).
As noted by Haider, however, even purely transitory increases in earnings dispersion can have welfare costs. For
example, transitory earnings declines can force consumption reductions for liquidity-constrained individuals even
if their permanent earnings are unaffected.
Another indication that persistent inequality has grown is the increased dispersion in consumption expenditures.
See Cutler and Katz (1992) and Attanasio and Davis (1996). Blundell and Preston (1998) present related evidence
for the United Kingdom.
2Second, we exploit our extraordinary data set to achieve some methodological advances.
The relatively small scale of the available U.S. panel surveys has forced U.S. researchers to rely
on simple models that impose economically implausible restrictions. Thanks to the much larger
sample size of our data set, we are able to estimate much richer models that nest the various
specifications used in the U.S. literature. We therefore are able to test the restrictions commonly
used in U.S. research, and we also can explore the sensitivity of substantive results to the
imposition of those restrictions. Our data strongly reject some of those restrictions, and they also
indicate that the imposition of those evidently false restrictions can distort substantive inferences
about the nature of earnings dynamics and the sources of changes in earnings inequality.
In the next section, we provide a detailed description of our data base. In Section III, we
develop econometric models of earnings dynamics and discuss our estimation methods. Section
IV contains our empirical results, and Section V summarizes and discusses the main fmdings.
II .Data
A. Data Base
The data base we use was developed by Statistics Canada from the T-4 Supplementary
Tax File maintained by Revenue Canada.5 This file is a one-percent random sample of all
individuals who received a T-4 supplementary tax form, and filed a tax return (a T- I form), in at
least one year between 1975 and 1993. T-4's are issued by employers for any earnings that
(1) exceed a certain annual threshold and/or (2) trigger income tax, contributions to Canada's
public pension plans, or unemployment insurance premiums.6 T-4's are analogous to the W-2
The construction of the data base is described in Morissette and Berube (1996). Our description draws heavily on
this source.
3forms issued by employers in the United States, and the T- 1 forms are the counterparts of the
ever-popular 1040 forms. The annual threshold (condition 1) was equal to $250 for the years
1975-1988 and $500 for 1989-1993. This provision likely superseded the requirements of
condition 2 in the vast majority of cases in which T-4's were issued over the sample period.7 To
obtain a sample which is consistent over time, we exclude all forms with annual earnings less than
$250 in 1975 dollars. The resulting threshold equals, for example, $645 in 1989 and $738 in
1993. Therefore, annual earnings is the sum of earnings from all jobs held by an individual in a
given year that paid at least $250 in 1975 constant dollars.
This measure of earnings has several advantages over its counterparts in survey data and
other administrative files. Most importantly, it is based on employers' reports under the
provisions of the income tax laws. Therefore, the earnings variable should be free of the
measurement error often observed in survey data due to, for example, recall error, rounding error,
and top-coding. Also, missing values should be of limited concern to the extent that tax
compliance is widespread, or that evasion is more typically an individual (rather than employer)
infraction and/or involves other types of income. Note that, unlike other tax-file-based data, the
earnings measure is not obtained from tax returns (the T- 1 form). This is important as the
decision to file a return is not exogenous, and the incentives for doing so may change over time,
6Thedata include incorporated self-employed individuals who pay themselves a salary, but not other self-employed
workers. The self-employed presumably have more volatile earnings than most workers, and their share of the
Canadian work force has trended slightly upwards over our sample period. Our finding below that earnings
instability has increased in Canada is all the more striking in light of our failure to encompass all of the self-
employed.
Income tax is deducted whenever an employee's annual income (earnings plus interest income, dividends, etc.)
exceeds his or her personal exemption. In most cases, the underlying annual earnings should be higher than the
current year's threshold. Public pension plan contributions are owed on earnings which exceed the year's basic
exemption, which ranged from $700 in 1975 up to $3500 in 1993. Finally, unemployment insurance contributions
are made whenever employment exceeds certain time (15 hours per week in 1993) or earnings ($149 per week in
1993) thresholds. It is possible that an individual could be issued a T-4 form for weekly work that triggered
4which could introduce selection effects to the data.8 In the T-4 file, the only information taken
from T- 1 forms is the birth date and sex of the individual. To obtain this information, it is
necessary that he or she filed a tax return at least once in the sample period. While it would be
preferable to have data that are completely independent of an individual's decision to file a return,
this is a much weaker requirement than consecutive filing over the sample period.
One limitation of the T-4 file is that, like most administrative data, it contains little
demographic information on individuals. For example, we do not know the educational
attainment of our sample members and therefore are unable to decompose earnings inequality into
the portions occurring within and between education categories. Instead, like most U.S. studies
that decompose the rise in earnings inequality into persistent and transitory components, we
consider changing returns to education as merely one aspect of change in persistent inequality.
Given the evidence that returns to education have not changed much in Canada, our inability to
isolate earnings differences between education categories is less important than it would be in the
U.S. context.
The target group in our sample selection is males between the ages of 25 and 58. These
individuals will likely have already completed most of their schooling, and are too young to be
strongly affected by the trend to earlier retirement.9 In constructing our analysis sample, we
refine Haider's (1998) revolving balanced panel design to take advantage of the very large size of
unemployment insurance contributions even though annual earnings do not exceed the annual threshold ($250 or
$500). We expect that these cases are of limited importance.
8Ofparticular concern in the present context is the introduction during the late 1980's of the Goods and Services
Tax, which included a new refundable tax credit for low-income Canadians. In a study based on tax returns, such
as Beach and Finnie (1997), the resulting change in the population of return-filers could be confounded with
changes in the earnings distribution.
There has been a strong increase in school enrollment among individuals 17-24 over this period (Morissette,
1997), which might affect our inference if we included younger males. Application for a public pension in
Canada can be. made as early as age 60.
5the T-4 file. We begin by identifying the nineteen two-year birth cohorts who are between the
ages 24 and 59 for at least nine years in the period 1975 through 1993, and select all males who
had positive earnings in each year that the age requirement is met.'° We then discard the first and
last years of earnings for each individual. This is done to ensure that a consistent selection
criterion is applied to each year of positive earnings; that is, we only include years of positive
earnings which are bordered by years of positive earnings. The concern is that, without this
requirement, the earnings variances in the first and last years will be inflated by labor market
entry, retirement, or migration in or out of Canada. The end result is a balanced earnings panel
for each cohort, with the panel length varying across cohorts. Our overall analysis sample
contains 32,105 individuals, and the sample size for each cohort rivals the pooled sample sizes
available in common longitudinal data sets. Table 1 contains a summary of the cohorts/panels that
are included through this process.
A fully balanced panel design is not appropriate for the current purpose because average
age and time will be perfectly collinear, and it will be difficult to separate the effects of age and
time on earnings inequality. Our inference is based on an aggregate panel in which the (balanced)
cohort panels are stacked. As is evident in the second column of Table 2, the age range in this
larger sample remains approximately constant over much of the sample period, thus breaking the
direct link between time and age, though the sample does age somewhat between 1976 and 1981
and again between 1987 and 1992.
By requiring consecutive years of positive earnings, we lose individuals who have particularly long spells of
joblessness. Note, however, that individuals in our sample can have jobless spells up to 22 months long, depending
on how they fall across the calendar year. Also, because individuals are identified in the T-4 file by their Social
Insurance Number (SIN), we will lose track of a person if he changes his SIN in the sample period. This might
lead us to mistakenly infer that an individual leaves when this change takes place.
6An alternative approach would be to use an unbalanced sample design in which any years
of positive earnings for individuals satisfying the age requirements in the sample period would be
included. The obvious advantage here is that the resulting panel is more representative of
individuals with positive earnings at a point in time. In practice, however, unbalanced panels can
pose difficult estimation problems for the types of models used here." In addition, the various
sample moments for a given cohort are based on somewhat different samples, so that measured
changes over time may confound sample composition effects with true time and life-cycle
effects.'2 Our approach avoids those problems and still allows the separation of time and age
effects. Its most obvious shortcomings are the possible selection effects of focusing on
individuals with at least nine consecutive years of positive earnings, and that earnings covariances
of different orders are observable for different numbers of cohorts who, in turn, face different
selection criteria. For example, sixteenth-order covariances are observed only for the nine cohorts
born in 1934/35 through 1950/5 1. The individuals in these cohorts have nineteen consecutive
years of positive earnings. In contrast, first-order covariances are observed for all cohorts, which
include individuals who have as few as nine consecutive years of positive earnings. Some direct
evidence of how the aggregate balanced panel represents the target population of males aged 25
to 58 is provided in the next subsection.
Moffitt and (3ottschalk (1995) provide evidence of the sorts of problems encountered with unbalanced panels in
this context.
12Anobvious example is that the variances for years t and swouldbe based on different samples. A more subtle
example is that the variance in year twouldbe estimated on the basis of all individuals with positive earnings in
that year, but the estimated autocovariance between years tandswouldbe based on only those positive earners in
year twhoalso had positive earnings in year s.
7B. Overview of Trends in Inequality
In the third and fourth columns of Table 2, we present the sample size and variance of log
earnings for all the individuals in our pooled analysis sample. For example, in 1976 this includes
the selected individuals in cohorts born in 1924/25 through 1950/51. The variance shows a clear
upward trend over our sample period, and it displays substantial cyclical movements as well. To
recognize the latter, it helps to know that the Canadian labor market was fairly stable from 1976
through 1981, with annual unemployment rates ranging between 7.2 percent and 8.4 percent.
Unlike the United States, Canada did not experience a recession in 1980. It was hard hit by the
1982 recession, however, with unemployment rising to 11.0 percent in 1982 and 11.9 percent in
1983. Unemployment gradually receded afterwards, but leaped again to 10.4 percent in 1991 and
11.3 percent in 1992.
The variance series in the fourth column is plotted as the solid line in Figure 1. The
variance rises by more than a third in the 1982 recession and then falls gradually in the expansion
of the late 1980's, although it never reaches its pre-recession levels. In the recession of the early
1990's, the variance rises again, this time to a new high. This time-series behavior of earnings
dispersion in our data set is altogether consistent with the patterns reported by the Canadian
studies cited in footnote 2. Most of those studies are based on Canada's Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF), and it is reassuring that the SCF data and our data based on tax reports tell the
same story. The advantage of our data set is that, because of its longitudinal aspect, we will be
able to sort the trend toward greater earnings inequality into its persistent and transitory
components.
In the remaining columns of Table 2, we provide some evidence of how the trends in our
revolving balanced panel represent the experience of our target population. In the fifth and sixth
8columns, we present the sample sizes and variances of log earnings when we maintain the same
age ranges as in our analysis sample but include all individuals with positive earnings in a given
year. In many years, the sample size almost doubles, as do the variances. Next, in the seventh
and eighth columns, we examine the sample of individuals aged 25 to 58 who had positive
earnings in a given year. In this step we focus on a constant age interval, so the sample does not
age over time. While there are some minor discrepancies from the previous two columns, it is
clear that the requirement of positive earnings in consecutive years, rather than marginal aging
over time, accounts for the differences in the variances between our analysis sample and the
sample of all males aged 25 to 58.
Ourrevolving balanced sample approach leads to smaller estimates of the variance of log
earnings, but they appear to be smaller than the variances intheother samples by a roughly fixed
factor of one-half. This suggests that the variances in the alternative samples may follow similar
patterns over time. This is important since our primary focus is on changes in earnings inequality
over time, rather than its absolute level. In Figure 1, we also graph the time pattern of variances
in our two comparison samples. As expected, they appear to shadow the variances in our analysis
sample. In fact, the correlation coefficient between the variances in our analysis sample and the
sample with the same age restrictions but all individuals with positive earnings is 0.957. Likewise,
the correlation coefficient between the variances in the analysis sample and the sample of
individuals 25-58 with positive earnings is O.943.' The primary discrepancy appears on a cyclical
basis, with the variance in the analysis sample growing relative to the variance in the larger
samples during recessions. This pattern is unsurprising because lower earners
13Furthermore,there is similar coherence in other moments. The correlation coefficients between mean log
earnings in the analysis sample and the other two samples are 0.999 and 0.997 respectively.
9presumably are especially prone to drop out of the unbalanced larger samples during recessions.'4
This sample composition effect dampens the countercydicality of earnings dispersion in the
unbalanced samples. In the analysis sample, which reduces the sample composition effect by
following the same workers over time, the true countercydicality of earnings dispersion is more
apparent.15
Overall, although the level of earnings dispersion is much lower in the analysis sample, all
three samples show similar behavior over time. Where they differ the most, in their cyclical
amplitudes, the analysis sample probably provides a more accurate picture. At the least, it should
provide a useful depiction of earnings inequality among those men with relatively stable
employment careers.
In Figures 2 and 3, we present some detail on how different age groups within our analysis
sample fared over the period. In Figure 2, we plot mean log earnings for five-year age categories,
normalizing each series to equal 1 in 1979 to provide a common basis of comparison across the
series of different lengths. For example, as documented in the second column of Table 2, the
complete age group 26-30 is visible in the analysis sample only between 1976 and 1987, while the
age group 51-55is visible only from 1979 to 1992. Mean log earnings for the different groups
moves in tandem up until 1982, but then we observe divergence. For example, by 1987 (the last
year for the 26-to-30-year-olds) the difference in average log earnings between 46-to-50-year-
olds and 26-to-30-year-olds has increased roughly 2.1 percent over its level in 1979. Further
'Fora discussion of U.S. evidence on the greater employment cyclicality of low earners, see Solon, Barsky, and
Parker (1994).
15TheU.S. evidence discussed in Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) suggests that the countercyclicality of
dispersion in annual earnings arises mainly from countercyclicality in the dispersion of annual hours, rather than
in the dispersion of hourly wage rates. We are not aware of Canadian evidence on this point.
10changes are observed in the late 1980's and early 1990's. The difference in log earnings between
3l-to-35-year- olds and 46-to-50-year-olds is up 1.2 percent in 1987 and 2.6 percent by 1992.
In Figure 3, we provide complementary information about the variance of log earnings.
Again we normalize each series to equal 1 in 1979. Corresponding to the effects of the recession
on the means, there is a sharp increase in the variances in 1982 which is particularly severe for
younger workers. In 1983, the variance for 26-to-30-year- olds is up 80 percent over its level in
1979, while the increase for older workers is on the order of 25 to 30 percent. The recession of
the early 1990's also has the greatest effect on the young. Between 1989 and 1992, the increases
in the variances for 31-to-35-year-olds and 36-to-40-year-olds are 68 percent and 42 percent
respectively. In contrast, the increase over the same period is 29 percent for 41-to-45-year-olds,
37 percent for 46-to-50-year-olds, and 4 percent for 50-to-55-year-olds.
One previous study, by Morissette and Berube (1996), has used the same tax data we use
to generate preliminary evidence on the extent to which the growth in annual earnings inequality
reflects an increase in persistent inequality. To get a measure of persistent inequality, Morissette
and Berube take a sample of workers within each of a variety of age ranges as of 1975, they sum
the workers' earnings over the 1975-1984 period, and then they calculate several dispersion
measures for the ten-year earnings total.16 Then they perform the same exercise for the 1984-
1993 earnings total and compare the dispersion measures between the two ten-year periods. For
example, for men ages 35-44 as of 1975, the coefficient of variation in the 1975-1984 total of
earnings is 0.5 12. For men 35-44 as of 1984, the coefficient of variation in the 1984-1993
16
Surprisingly,Morissette and Berube base their tabulated results on total nominal earnings with no discounting.
They report in a footnote, however, that they obtain qualitatively similar results for real earnings discounted
annually by 3 or 7 percent.
11earnings total is 12 percent higher at 0.573. Regardless of age range or dispersion measure,
Morissette and Berube find greater dispersion in the later period.
Morissette and Berube's evidence strongly suggests that the persistent component of
earnings variation did increase between 1975-1984 and 1984-1993, but this fmding leaves some
important questions unanswered. First, a comparison of two ten-year periods does not pinpoint
the timing of the increase in persistent earnings inequality, and this creates some ambiguity in how
to interpret the comparison. For example, to what extent does the difference between periods
reflect a secular trend or a difference in business cycle conditions? As Morissette and Berube
acknowledge, "Since the unemployment rates observed since the mid-eighties were higher than
those of the mid-seventies, one possibility is that the increase in long-term inequality that we
found simply reflects a cyclical effect. Because we have been comparing two periods and thus
have been using only two observations, we have been unable to control for such an effect."
Second, their evidence does not provide a direct indication of whether (or when) the transitory
component of earnings variation also increased. The remainder of our paper develops and
estimates models designed to answer these questions.
III. Econometric Models and Estimation Methods
A. Models
Earnings dynamics and their implications for the connection between current and lifetime
income have long been of central concern in numerous areas of economic research. Research on
the distinction between the inequality observed in annual cross-sections of earnings and inequality
in long-run earnings is just one such area. Another classic example is the research, going back at
least to Friedman (1957), on the difference in the response of consumption to changes in
12transitory versus permanent income. Still another example is the recent research showing that the
intergenerational correlation in earnings appears far greater for long-run measures of earnings
than it does for single-year measures (Solon, forthcoming).
Because of its recurring importance in many research areas, earnings mobility has been the
subject of a voluminous empirical literature.'7 To explain the connection between the models in
the literature and the models estimated in this paper, we will begin with a rudimentary version of
the canonical variance-components models of earnings dynamics and then embellish it in order to
allow for changes over time in both the persistent and transitory components of earnings
variation.
Let btdenotethe log earnings in year t of the thsamplemember born in year b.Then
(1)1bt—PbtYbt
expresses1btasthe cohort-specific meanin year tplusan individual-specific deviation
fromthat mean. Most previous studies of earnings dynamics have attempted to partial out p
with preliminary regression adjustments for year and age (or experience) effects and then have
estimated models for the dynamics of y,,,. By doing so, they have characterized both the cross-
sectional variance and the year-to-year mobility in relative earnings within a cohort.
A stripped-down version of the commonly used models for y is
(2) = a +v,
17
SeeAtkinson, Bourguignon, and Morrisson (1992) for an elegant survey of the literature up through most of the
1980's. See Baker (1997) and Haider (1998) for more recent analyses and for references to other studies since the
late 1980's. Aside from the study by Beach and Finnie (1997) cited in footnote 8, the only other study of Canadian
earnings dynamics of which we are aware is Kennedy (1989), which uses a small sample of earnings histories
drawn from a Canada Pension Plan administrative file. Kennedy does not explore how the transitory and
persistent components of earnings variation have changed over time.
13where the permanent earnings component alb has population variance a ,thetransitory
component VIb, has variance a and is serially uncorrelated, and alb and VIb, are orthogonal to
each other. A nice feature of this exceedingly simple model is that it provides a clear
representation of the distinction between inequality in current and permanent earnings. The
variance in current relative earnings YIb,
(3)Var(ylb,) =+
whichexceeds a, the variance in the permanent component of earnings, by a, the variance of
transitory earnings.'8
This rudimentary model, however, possesses several weaknesses that render it
inappropriate for our purposes. To begin with, it does not allow for changes in earnings
inequality over time. Following Katz (1994), Moffitt and (ottschalk (1995), and Haider (1998),
a simple way to incorporate such changes is with the enhanced model
(4) =p,alb +
wherep, and .X, are the respective year-specific factor loadings on the permanent and transitory
components of relative earnings. Then the variance of y, becomes
(5)Var(y,) = +
Asthis expression shows, an increase in either factor loading generates increased dispersion in
current earnings. The character of the change in inequality, however, depends critically on which
factor changes. A rise in p, increases inequality in long-run earnings as well as in current
earnings. The relative advantage of workers with chronically high earnings increases, as does the
18Thepredominant role of C, in long-run earnings inequality is demonstrated for a more general model in Solon
(1999).
14relative disadvantage of those with chronically low earnings. On the other hand, if A1 increases
without any change in Pt' inequality in current earnings rises because of an increase in year-to-
year volatility, but there is no increase in the variance of the permanent component of earnings.
Since an increase in either factor loading increases the variance of Yjbt' variances by
themselves cannot identify which component of inequality has changed. What does identify the
source of the increased cross-sectional inequality is changes in observed autocovariances. In an
era when p rises to a higher level, the autocovariances grow along with the variances. Indeed, if
Pt increases without a change in A, the autocovariances grow in greater proportion than the
variances, so the autocorrelations increase. In other words, the increase in cross-sectional
inequality is accompanied by a decrease in mobility. In contrast, if A? increases without a change
in Pt' the rise in variances is not accompanied by a rise in autocovariances, and the
autocorrelations decline. Although this point is particularly clear in the context of the model in
equation (4), it does extend to more complex models. Heuristically, an increase in p1 preserves
the order of individuals in the earnings distribution, but spreads them out further, and this greater
spread persists from year to year. An increase in A leads to more scrambling of individuals'
order in the annual earnings distribution, and the scrambling gets redone every year.
Although the model in equation (4) does incorporate changes in both the persistent and
transitory components of earnings inequality, it stifi overlooks several important features of
earnings dynamics that have been documented in the previous literature. First, several studies
have found evidence of persistent heterogeneity across individuals not only in their levels of
15earnings, but in their growth rates.19 Second, some earnings shocks have permanent effects,2° and
some of the more recent literature on earnings dynamics has modeled such earnings variation with
a random-walk component (MaCurdy, 1982; Abowd and Card, 1989; Moffitt and Gottscha]k,
1995). Third, most studies have found that the transitory component is serially correlated.
Fourth, several studies have found that the variance of the transitory component is a U-shaped
function of age or experience.2'
A generalization of equation (4) that encompasses these aspects of earnings dynamics is





(9)Var(vb)= y+y,(t—b—26)+y2(t —b—26)2 +y3(t—b— 26) +y4(t—b-- 26).
We wifi refer to the model in equations (6)-(9) as our "base model." In equation (6), I3jbisthe
deviation of the individual's idiosyncratic earnings growth rate from the average growth rate of
his cohort (which already was subsumed in the ,Ubt term in equation (1)). This individual-specific
growth rate J3b is expressed as a coefficient of years since age 26, so the variance in the
individual-specific intercept alb reflects variance across individuals' earnings profiles as of age
'° See Baker (1997) and the references therein. This finding of growth heterogeneity is to be expected, since the
sources of life-cycle earnings growth --suchas human capital investment and schemes to elicit work effort --
presumablydo vary across individuals.
20 One good example is the earnings losses suffered by displaced workers. See Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan
(1993) and Stevens (1997). Another example, stressed by Farber and Gibbons (1996), is the wage impact of the
arrival of new information about workers' productivities.
21 See Gordon (1984), for example.
1626, and the variance in influenceshow the variance across earnings profiles evolves after age
26. We will denote the variance of $,,asand the covariance between a and f3asa.
If workers' choices about human capital investment involve trade-offs between early earnings
levels and opportunities for subsequent earnings growth, o may be negative (Mincer, 1974;
Lifiard and Weiss, 1979; Hause, 1980).
In equation (7), which specifies a random-walk component in earnings growth after age
26,22 risa "white noise" innovation with variance a,. The random-walk innovation ,,
unlikethe transitory innovation VIb:inequation (8), accommodates any permanent re-ordering of
workers in the earnings distribution. One way to distinguish the random-walk component from
the heterogeneous-growth component is that the former implies that the cross-sectional log
earnings variances should rise linearly over the life cycle, while the latter implies a quadratic
pattern. Equation (8) incorporates serial correlation of the transitory component via a first-order
autoregressive process generalized to include year-specific factor loadings on the innovation VIb,.
Thisspecification assumes that, if year t is a year with unusually large innovations in the
transitory earnings component (e.g., a recession year), the impact on the transitory variance in
subsequent years dies out gradually. In addition, equation (9) allows the variance of va,,tobe a
quartic function of age.23
While this model imposes a great deal of structure on earnings dynamics, it significantly
generalizes previous models by allowing for multiple sources of nonstationarity (with respect to
22
Anysuch growth up through age 26 is subsumed in the a,bterm.
23Whilelower-order polynomials are sufficient in some of the models we estimate, the quartic is adopted for
comparability across specifications. We also have tried extending our AR(l) specification in equation (8) to an
ARMA(1,1) specification. See the discussion in footnote 24.
17both calendar time and stage of life cycle). Like the models of Moffitt and Gottschalk (1995) and
Haider (1998), it goes beyond earlier models by allowing for changes over calendar time in both
the persistent and transitory components of earnings inequality. The model also extends Haider's
by incorporating age-related heteroskedasticity of the transitory variance and a random-walk
component. Relative to Moffitt and Gottschalk's preferred model, it adds both age variation in
the transitory variance and heterogeneity in growth rates. Because previous researchers have had
to rely on U.S. panel surveys with relatively small sample sizes, they have been unable to identify
models with many sources of nonstationarity, and they therefore have had to make arbitrary
choices about which varieties to include. For example, they have included either a random walk
or heterogeneous growth, but not both. Our access to a large sample observed over many years
enables us to identify richer models and to examine empirically which sources of nonstationarity
play important roles in the earnings process. Consequently, in addition to generating evidence
about the nature of growing earnings inequality in Canada, our study also responds to Atkinson,
Bourguignon, and Morrisson's (1992) comment that distinguishing among competing models of
earnings mobility "is important and tests of alternative specifications should be conducted.
However, we have found few tests of that type in the literature we have reviewed."
B. Estimation Methods
We begin by estimating p in equation (1) with the sample mean log earnings for cohort
b in year t. We then treat the deviation of observed log earnings 1 from that mean as our
measure of yth, This simple "de-meaning" procedure adjusts for year, age, and cohort effects on
average earnings in a less restrictive way than the preliminary regressions typically used, which
18assume that the age and cohort patterns within any year can be well approximated by a low-order
polynomial in age or experience.
Next, for each of our nineteen sample cohorts (born 1924/25 through 1960/61), we
construct the sample autocovariance matrix of y. For the nine cohorts observed for the entire
1976-1992 sample period, these are 17x 17 matrices; the matrices for the other cohorts have
smaller dimensions. (At the beginning of Section IV, we will display and discuss these matrices
for a few selected cohorts.) Then we list the distinct elements of the sample autocovariance
matrix for cohort b in a vector Cb,whichcontains 153=(17 x 18)/2 elements for each of the nine
cohorts observed for the full sample period and fewer elements for the others. For purposes of
standard error estimation, we also construct the matrix of fourth sample moments for each cohort.
We stack the nineteen Cb vectors into an aggregate vector C, which contains a total of
2077 sample moments. These are the data to which we fit the model of earnings dynamics
described above. We estimate the model's parameters by generalized method-of-moments
(GMM); that is, by minimizing the distance between the observed sample moments in C and the
corresponding population moments implied by our model.
In particular, write the population analog to C as C *andexpress our model's moment
restrictions as C =f(0) where 0 is the vector containing all the parameters in our model. For
example, our model in equations (6)-(9) implies that one element in c *,thevariance of th,in
1986 for the cohort born in 1950/1951, is
(10)Var(y19501511986) =P9s6(cr + 100o + 20aap + 10a) + p2Var(E1195015985)
+ '986('0 +by1+lOOy2 + 100073 + lO,000y4)
where 10 and its multiples appear because we count this cohort as 10 years past age 26 in 1986.
19As ugly as this expression is, writing it out here serves at least two purposes. First, its
complexity makes clear why we are not writing out the rest of the moments! Second, the
dependence of the cohort's overall 1986 variance on its transitory variance in 1985 ifiustrates that
the autoregressive process in equation (8) induces a recursive structure in the moments. If one
traces the recursion back to the first year of the cohort's sample period (in this instance 1976),
this raises the question of what the cohort's transitory variance is in that year. In the previous
literature on earnings dynamics, it has been common to restrict the initial transitory variance to be
the same for individuals of different ages. In our richer model, which recognizes that earnings
volatility varies across cohorts because they are at different stages of the life cycle and have lived
through different times, this restriction becomes untenable. We therefore treat the initial
transitory variances of the nineteen cohorts as nineteen additional parameters to be estimated.24
Once C* =f(9) is specified, then GMM chooses 0 to minimize a distance function
(11)D={C—f(&)]'W{C—f(O)J
where W is a positive defmite weighting matrix. The asymptotically optimal choice of W is the
inverse of a matrix that consistently estimates the covariance matrix of C. As explained by
A]tonii and Segal (1996) and Clark (1996), however, this approach can produce seriously biased
estimates of 9 in finite samples. We therefore follow the practice of the most recent literature
and use the identity matrix as the weighting matrix. This approach, often called "equally weighted
minimum distance estimation," just amounts to using nonlinear least squares to fit f (0) to C.
24 These cohort effects turn out to be important to the specification of the other parts of the transitory component.
An ARMA( 1,1) extension of equation (8) can be supported if the cohort effects are treated symmetrically in the
persistent and transitory components; that is, if the model either excludes or includes cohort effects in both
components. In a model such as equations (6)-(9), where the cohort effects appear in only one component, the
ARMA specification either clues not converge or converges to a solution with negative estimates of some variance
20Finally, we use standard methods for estimating the covariance matrix of 6 on the basis of the
fourth moments in the sample.25
IV. Results
In lieu of deluging the reader with all 2077 sample moments, in Tables 3 and 4 we display
the sample autocovariance matrices for just the cohorts born in 1926/27, 1942/43, and 1958/59.
For all three cohorts (as well as the other sixteen not shown), the autocorrelation patterns in the
upper right triangles of the matrices are similar to those reported in U.S. studies based on the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Like Baker (1997) and Haider (1998), we fmd
autocorrelations of around 0.8 at the first order, followed by gradual declines at higher orders.26
Because these three cohorts are at different stages of the life cycle during our 1976-1992
sample period, they illustrate important life-cycle patterns in earnings dynamics as well as some
salient trends and cyclical patterns. The 1958/59 cohort, which is in its mid twenties in its first
years in the sample, initially shows very large variances (on the main diagonal), which
subsequently decline as the cohort settles into its mature career path. The lower autocorrelations
displayed by this young cohort suggest that its higher variances are driven at least partly by high
transitory variation. At the other end of the life cycle, the 1926/27 cohort shows rising variances
as it approaches retirement age during its last years in the sample. These obvious patterns suggest
the importance of including age-varying parameters in econometric models of earnings dynamics.
terms. Consistent with the evidence in Raider (1998), we find that our decompositions are not sensitive to the
choice of this part of the model.
25 See Chamberlain (1984) for a general discussion of GMM estimation and inference, and see the appendix to
Abowd and Card (1989) for a detailed application to earnings dynamics models.
26 We also have calculated sample autocovariance matrices for the first difference of y. These show
autocorrelation patterns quite similar to those reported in Abowd and Card (1989) and Baker (1997).
21The year effects apparent in these matrices echo the patterns already discussed in
connection with Table 2 and Figures 1 and 3. The sample variances rise dramatically with the
1982 recession and then recede a little in the late 1980's before rising to new heights during the
recession of the early 1990's. The upper-right triangles of the matrices display one more pattern
not visible in the earlier tables and figures --thereis not a striking secular trend in the
autocorrelations. As explained in Section III, an increase in only the transitory variance
component would cause the autocorrelations to decline, and an increase in only the persistent
component would make them rise. A complete absence of trend in the autocorrelations would
signify that the transitory and persistent components grew in equal proportions. Although the
autocorrelation trend is not strong enough to be visible to the naked eye, a subtle trend may be
present. Pooling all the autocorrelations for all cohorts and years, we have performed least
squares estimation of the regression of the log of the autocorrelation between years t and s on a
linear time trend variable, the unemployment rates in both years t and s, a cubic in age, and fixed
effects for the order of the autocorrelation. The estimated coefficient of the linear trend variable
is 0.0013 with an estimated standard error of 0.0006. The small magnitude of the estimated
upward trend in the autocorrelations suggests that the rise in earnings inequality was generated by
increases in both the transitory and persistent components, but there is some initial evidence that
the persistent component grew by a marginally larger proportion.
To investigate these patterns more formally, we proceed to GMM estimation of the
earnings dynamics model laid out in Section III. Table 5 shows the resulting estimates. In the
first two columns are the parameter estimates and associated standard error estimates for the base
model described in equations (6)-(9). Recall that this model incorporates a persistent component,
composed of terms capturing individual-specific heterogeneity in the age/earnings profile as well
22as a random walk, plus a transitory component following an AR(1) process with age-based
heteroskedastic innovations. Furthermore, each component's variance is shifted over time by a
separate year-specific factor loading.
The estimates of a andin the first two rows express the heterogeneity in the
intercept and slope of the age/earnings profile. They are generally smaller than the estimates
found in studies of U.S. men. For example, our estimated standard deviation in earnings growth
rates,=.10.000090=0.0095,is a bit less than half of the most comparable estimates in Baker
(1997) and Haider (1998). Baker and Haider, however, do not allow for a random-walk
component, age-related heteroskedasticity in the transitory innovations, or differences across
cohorts in their initial transitory variances, so all of the age structure in earnings dispersion
necessarily gets loaded into the growth heterogeneity part of their models. Our significantly
positive estimate of o in the seventh row indicates that the random-walk component also plays a
role, and, as will be seen below, our results also point to substantial age-related heteroskedasticity
in the transitory component.
Nevertheless, even our smaller estimate ofis both statistically and substantively
significant. It implies that a worker with a growth rate one standard deviation above the mean
would accumulate a 10 percent earnings advantage over the course of a decade. As in several
previous studies (Lifiard and Weiss, 1979; Hause, 1980; Baker, 1997; Haider, 1998), our estimate
of in the third row is significantly negative, corresponding to a trade-off between earnings
early in the career and subsequent earnings growth.
In the seventeen rows starting with the eighth, we report the estimates of the year-specific
factor loadings on the persistent component. For identffication, the parameter for 1976 is
23normalized to equal 1. The estimated factor loadings are a little above 1 in the years immediately
after 1976, and then they increase sharply in the recession of 1982. There is a gradual decay over
the expansion of the late 1980's and then another sharp increase in the recession of the early
1990's. The countercydicality of the estimated factor loadings is consistent with the U.S.
evidence that the annual work hours of low-wage workers are especially sensitive to the business
cycle (Solon, Barsky, and Parker, 1994). The upward secular trend in the estimated factor
loadings, foreshadowed by the patterns in the empirical autocovariance matrices reported in
Tables 3 and 4, suggests that the persistent component plays an important role in the increase in
earnings inequality over the period. Even though the previous literature reports that the return to
education in Canada did not increase appreciably over this period, more generally the return to
persistent worker attributes did trend upwards. This finding accords with Morissette and
Berube's (1996) result that the dispersion in earnings summed over ten years increased from
1975-1984 to 1984-1993.
In the next section of the table, we report the estimated parameters for the transitory
component. First are the estimates of the "initial variances," which capture the accumulation of
the transitory process up to the start of the sample period for each cohort. As was shown in
Table 1, age in the initial year (1976) declines monotonically for cohorts 1924/25 through
1950/51. In turn, the estimated initial variances for these cohorts display a vaguely U-shaped
pattern, although there are spikes for some of the middle cohorts. The estimated initial variances
for cohorts 1950/51 through 1960/61 document how the accumulation of the transitory process
changed for 26-year-olds over the period. The clear message here is that dispersion has been
increasing, as the variance estimates more than double from 1976 (cohort 1950/5 1) to 1986
(cohort 1960/61).
24In the next block are the estimates of the autoregressive parameter p and the parameters
of the quartic in age for the variance of the innovations to the transitory process. Our j3= 0.540
is quite similar to Baker and Haider's most comparable estimates. The estimated parameters of
the age quartic imply the profile shown in Figure 4. There is an initial decline in the variance of
the innovations as it falls more than 50 percent from the mid twenties to the early forties. As was
suggested above, the variance flattens out in mid-age. Finally, it rises in the fifties although not to
the levels observed at the beginning of the age profile. This pattern is consistent with other
evidence in the literature (Gordon, 1984) and points to the importance of accounting for the
systematic influence of age on transitory innovations to earnings.
In the fmal block of the table, we report the estimated year-specific factor loadings on the
transitory innovation. Here we must use the normalization that the parameter for 1977 equals 1,
since the variance of this component in 1976 is left unrestricted to identify the initial variances of
the cohorts .Notsurprisingly, here we see more cyclical variation than was apparent in the factor
loadings for the persistent component, with the transitory factor loadings rising more dramatically
in the recession of 1982.27 There is next some recovery from the recession, a fairly flat profile
over the expansion of the late 1980's, and finally another sharp increase in the recession of the
early 1990's.
Just plotting the time series of p. and A is not sufficient to give a full characterization of
the relative contributions of the persistent and transitory components to increases in earnings
inequality. The relative roles of the two components depend not only on these two factor
loadings but also on the relative magnitudes of the factors that they load, the initial transitory
variances, and the autoregressive parameter. Therefore, in Figure 5 we use our estimates of all
25these parameters to decompose our estimated model's predicted variance of log earnings into its
persistent and transitory components, holding age constant to abstract from any life-cycle
considerations. The decomposition is performed for males 40 years old, which is approximately
the midpoint of the ages observable in our sample, and it tells the story of individuals who in turn
should be in the middle of their working careers.28 In moving from year to year, the factor
loadings on the two components change, as does the initial variance used in generating the
transitory variance up to age 40.29
The first thing to note in Figure 5 is the increase in the total variance, primarily in steps
corresponding to the recessions over the sample period. This, of course, duplicates the pattern
seen earlier in Figure 1 (and in previous Canadian studies based on the Survey of Consumer
Finances). The novel feature of Figure 5 is its decomposition of the total variance into persistent
and transitory components. In the early years of the sample period, the persistent component
accounts for about 70 percent of the inequality in annual earnings. The two components move
remarkably similarly over time. Both components rise substantially in the recession starting in
1982, settle down during the recovery at a higher level than before the recession, and then leap to
new heights in the recession of the early 1990's. Because the transitory and persistent
components increase by similar absolute magnitudes from 1976 to 1992, the proportional share of
the persistent component is slightly lower in 1992 than in 1976.
27Haider(1998) reports a similar result for the United States.
28Wealso have performed the decomposition for ages 32 and 50. The results for age 50 are qualitatively very
similar to those for age 40. The results for age 32 assign a somewhat larger portion of the growth in earnings
inequality to the transitory component.
29Infact, the initial variance changes every two years, corresponding to the cohort estimates reported in Table 5.
Forexample, in 1976 we have a direct estimate of the variance of the transitory component for males aged 40 in
the initial variance for cohort 1936/37. In 1978, we use the initial variance for cohort 1938/39, whose members
are 40 in this year.
26A pairwise comparison of 1976 and 1992, however, is inadequate for trend analysis
because business-cycle conditions were not identical in the two years. To control for business-
cycle effects in an analysis spanning all seventeen years, we apply least squares to estimate time-
series regressions of the persistent and transitory components on a linear time trend and the
unemployment rate. The results are reported in Table 6. The point estimates suggest that the
persistent component contributed a marginally larger absolute amount to the upward trend in
earnings inequality. The estimated coefficients of the unemployment rate indicate a slightly larger
cyclical sensitivity in the transitory component. That said, the overall inference is consistent with
the impression from Figure 5 that the two series show similar cyclical movements and contribute
similar amounts to the secular increase in annual earnings inequality.
Our base model nests and extends most of the specifications used in U.S. studies. U.S.
researchers, who have had to rely on relatively small-scale panel surveys, have had to settle for
estimating simpler and more restrictive models than the base model used here. For example, even
though life-cycle variation in the transitory variance component is both economically plausible and
empirically supported by some earnings dynamics research, the recent U.S. studies that have
decomposed the inequality trend into persistent and transitory components have assumed away
that source of nonstationarity in the earnings process. Similarly, these studies have assumed
either heterogeneity in earnings growth rates or a random-walk process, but not both. Assuming
away one or the other is unfortunate because there are good reasons to expect both to be present.
It is hard to believe that the sources of earnings growth, such as human capital investment and
effort-elicitation schemes, operate with identical force for all individuals. It is just as hard to
believe there is no such thing as earnings shocks with permanent effects (e.g., job displacements,
disabling injuries, and new information about workers' skills).
27The fact that our base model encompasses these different aspects of earnings dynamics
allows us the opportunity to ask two related methodological questions. First, do our data reject
the restrictions imposed in the U.S. literature? Second, if so, does it matter? Is the imposition of
false restrictions innocuous for addressing the issues at hand, or does it distort the analysis of
those issues? In Tables 7 and 8, we explore both questions by estimating a series of restricted
models.
In the first two columns of Table 7, we examine the implications of assuming away
permanent earnings shocks by estimating a model with no random walk (i.e., with a =0).It is
clear that this "restricted model 1" is statistically indefensible, as the estimate of a in Table 5is
highly significant in both the statistical and economic senses. But does the imposition of the false
restriction that c =0make much difference for characterizing other aspects of earnings
dynamics? Comparing the results in Table 7 to those in Table 5revealsthat assuming away the
random walk leads to a larger estimate of the autoregressive parameter p and to smaller estimates
of cr and a. Also the estimated covariance of a and /3 now becomes positive although
statistically insignificant. For purposes of the present paper, we are most interested in how the
restriction affects the decomposition of earnings inequality into persistent and transitory
components. Therefore, in Figure 6 we present the decomposition for restricted model 1 so that
we can compare it to the decomposition shown in Figure 5 for the base model. Note first that,
with the restricted model, the persistent component makes up relatively less of total inequality at
any point in time. Whereas the persistent component represented roughly two-thirds of total
inequality in Figure 5, in Figure 6 the proportion varies between 50 and 60 percent. The
implication is a higher degree of mobility in the earnings distribution, although the larger estimate
28of p implies that transitory churning has longer persistence. A second difference is that the two
components seem less synchronous than in Figure 5. The persistent component exhibits greater
trend increase leading up to the 1982 recession, while the transitory component displays greater
increase thereafter. In Table 6 we report the results of time-series regressions of each component
on the unemployment rate and a linear trend. Relative to the base model, in the restricted model
the two components trade roles in their contributions to the inequality trend. It is now the
transitory component that makes the marginally larger contribution to rising inequality.
The models actually used in previous studies are more restrictive than this example, and
further restrictions can have larger effects on inference. In the next two columns of Table 7
("restricted model 2"), we report estimates of a specification that, relative to the base model,
assumes away both growth-rate heterogeneity in the persistent component and age-related
heteroskedasticity in the transitory innovation. The Wald test statistics reported in the first panel
of Table 8 make clear that these restrictions not only are economically implausible, but also are
statistically indefensible with our data. The test statistic for the null hypothesis of no growth-rate
heterogeneity (a =0and =0)has a p-value that is zero to at least four decimal places. So
does the test statistic for the null hypothesis of no age-related heteroskedasticity in the transitory
innovation (y =72 = 73 = = 0).Nevertheless, these restrictions are of considerable interest
because they are imposed in the preferred model in Moffitt and Gottschalk's (1995) influential
study. We therefore would like to know whether these restrictions are innocuous for purposes of
identifying trends in earnings inequality.
Comparing the parameter estimates for this specification to those for the base model,
again some change very little, and others change a lot. To explore how much the changes matter,
29in Figure 7 we plot the decomposition of total predicted inequality into persistent and transitory
components. Here there are some major differences from Figures 5and6. The persistent
component accounts for a little less than two-thirds of the total variance at the beginning of the
sample period. Unlike the preceding figures, however, Figure 7 shows the transitory component
increasing by more than the persistent component so that, by the end of the sample period, the
transitory component is just as large. This observation is formalized in time-series regressions
reported in Table 6. The results suggest the transitory component plays the dominant role in
trend increases in inequality. Therefore, while the estimates from the more general model indicate
that increases in the persistent component contributed marginally more to the growth in earnings
inequality, this simpler model imposing clearly false restrictions attributes most of the inequality
growth to the transitory component.
To explore further the implications of the choice between allowing for heterogeneous
growth rates or a random walk, in the last columns of Table 7 we report estimates for "restricted
model 3." In contrast to restricted model 2, this model incorporates heterogeneous growth rates
instead of a random walk, while continuing to assume away age-related heteroskedasticity in
transitory innovations. Once again, relative to the base model this model is statistically
indefensible, but it is of interest because it is comparable to the preferred model in Haider's
(1998) study. The resulting decomposition of total inequality is depicted in Figure 8 and Table 6.
Here the results are much closer to those for the base model, though they still imply a somewhat
larger role for the transitory component in rising inequality. The distinguishing feature between
restricted models 2 and 3 is that the former accommodates only linear life-cycle growth in
persistent earnings dispersion (through the unit root) while the latter can accommodate nonlinear
30effects (through the age profile). This distinction turns out to have a considerable impact on the
decomposition.
What do these results imply for the U.S. evidence on persistent versus transitory
components of rising earnings inequality? Until such time as U.S. data comparable to our
Canadian data become available to researchers, it wifi be impossible to say for sure whether our
results would be replicated in the U.S. context. Our specification analysis, however, is suggestive
of the possibility that the U.S. evidence has been distorted by the model restrictions necessitated
by small data sets. With the Canadian data, we have found that assuming away some aspects of
nonstationarity in life-cycle earnings dynamics leads to exaggeration of the role of the transitory
component in rising cross-sectional earnings inequality, and it understates the role of the
persistent component. This distortion is particularly serious in the case of Moffitt and
Gottschalk' s (1995) preferred specification.
This discussion, of course, begs the question of whether our own base model also imposes
false restrictions that affect inference. In defense of the base model, we reemphasize that it
incorporates most of the lessons of previous research, and we also note the usual trade-off
between the greater generality of a more complex model and its lesser parsimony and
inteffigibility. Nevertheless, it is very important to explore the implications of extending the model
further, and we do so in Table 5.
One conceptually straightforward extension of our base model is to allow for quadratic
heterogeneity in growth rates. If workers differ in the steepness of their earnings/age profiles,
why not in the curvature as well? Baker (1997) reports some evidence for heterogeneity in
curvature, and Lillard and Revile (1999) explain why this pattern ought to be expected. While
workers differ initially in the intensity of their human capital investment, all of them should stop
31investing by the ends of their careers. Therefore, those with the steepest earnings growth earlier
in their careers also should display more curvature in their earnings/age profiles.
To incorporate this possibility, we embellish equation (6) in our base model by adding an
individual-specific coefficient i,ii,,forthe square of age since 26. This introduces three new
parameters --thevariance of ijf and its covariances with abandf3ib --intoour model of
earnings covariances. Our results from estimating this "extended model 1" are shown in the third
and fourth columns of Table 5. Perhaps surprisingly, the data do not seem to care much for
adding only this embellishment to the base model. The estimated variance of V1,b is insignificantly
negative. As shown in the second panel of Table 8, a Wald test of the joint hypothesis that all
three new parameters are zero fails to reject at the 0.10 significance level. Adding the new
parameters to the model has very little effect on the other parameter estimates or on the
decomposition of earnings inequality into its persistent and transitory components.
Another natural extension of the base model is to supplement the cohort effects already
incorporated into the transitory component with cohort effects in the persistent component. The
possibility of inter-cohort variation in skill dispersion usually has been downplayed in the U.S.
literature on inequality trends. The introduction to Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce's (1993) important
study, for example, says, "we view the trend toward increased inequality not in terms of increased
dispersion in unobserved ability (or increased measurement error etc.) but rather as an increasing
market return to skill."3°
Nevertheless, we have two reasons for wanting to entertain the possibility of cohort
differences in the persistent component of earnings variation. First, we know of no basis for
32believing such cohort differences are absent, and there is some evidence they are present. While it
is difficult, if not impossible, to adduce convincing evidence with respect to dispersion in
unobserved ability, there is clear-cut variation across Canadian cohorts in the distribution of at
least one measurable trait, namely years of education. In each of three Canadian censuses (1976,
1981, and 1986), we have measured the variance of educational attainment among men who
worked in the reference week and belonged to a birth cohort appearing in our T-4 sample for that
year. Education measurement differs somewhat across censuses, and the appendix to this paper
provides details of the construction of our education variable. The results in Table 9 indicate that
the variance in years of education has declined dramatically between earlier and more recent
cohorts.
Second, even if skill dispersion did not vary across cohorts in the population, our sampling
scheme might induce inter-cohort variation in our sample. We require individuals to have
consecutive years of positive earnings in the years between 1976 and 1992 in which they satisfy
the requirement of being 24-59 years of age. For older cohorts this requires consecutive years of
positive earnings in the later stage of life, while for younger cohorts the consecutive years of
earnings are required as early as the mid twenties. It is easy to imagine that the types of
individuals who string together years of positive earnings early in life differ, in persistent ways,
from those who accomplish this feat later in the life cycle. This is another reason to question our
base model's assumption that cr,, is the same for all cohorts.
Therefore, in "extended model 2" we introduce cohort-specific values of a .The
resulting estimates are shown in the last two columns of Table 5. The first thing to note is that
30Juhn,Murphy, and Pierce (1993) present compelling evidence that rising inequality has stemmed in large part
from "an increasing market return to skill," but, as they acknowledge, their evidence cannot rule out effects from
33the data do seem to favor the addition of the new parameters. As shown in the third panel of
Table 8, a Wald test of the base model's restriction that all cohorts have the same
resoundingly rejects that restriction. The pattern shown by the point estimates is a systematic
decline across cohorts in their persistent heterogeneity until a leveling-out appears starting with
the cohort born in 1948/49. As shown in Table 9, this pattern coheres somewhat with the decline
between earlier and more recent cohorts in the variance of educational attainment. The
correlation between a cohort's variance in educational attainment and our estimate of its a
exceeds 0.8 regardless of which census we use to measure education.
The addition of the new parameters induces some notable changes in the estimates of
other parameters of the model. First, the data now become more enamored of the quadratic
specification of heterogeneity in earnings growth. The estimate of c now becomes significantly
positive, and a Wald test of the joint hypothesis that the three parameters associated with
quadratic heterogeneity are all zero rejects with a p-value of zero to at least four decimal places.
In accordance with Lillard and Revile's (1999) analysis, the estimated covariance between V'jb
andf31bisnow significantly negative --workerswith rapid early earnings growth experience
greater curvature later on.
Second, the estimates of the higher-order parameters in the age quartic for
heteroskedasticity in transitory innovations become larger. We graph the implied profile in Figure
9. Relative to Figure 4, the transitory variance declines more quickly with age, and there is a
stable, fairly flat segment between ages 35 and 52.
between-cohort changes in skill dispersion.
34Third, and more importantly for purposes of this paper, the estimates of the factor
loadings on the persistent and transitory components change quite dramatically. Relative to the
base model, the upward time trend in the loadings on the persistent component is now
considerably larger, while the loadings on the transitory component display greater cyclical
variation and less trend. This latter point can be seen by comparing the two models' estimates of
2forthe late 1980's, when the economy was in a sustained and wide-ranging expansion. The
estimates from extended model 2 are near 1.0, last seen in the late 1970's during another
expansionary period. In contrast, the estimates from the base model for these years display a
large trend increase relative to the late 1970's.
With respect to the persistent component, extended model 2 characterizes rising earnings
inequality as the net effect of two opposing developments. On one hand, the greater homogeneity
of the more recent cohorts has been a force toward more equal earnings. But this force has been
much more than offset by an upward trend in the factor loadings, which might be interpreted as a
rise in the returns to skill. In the base model, which assumes away cross-cohort changes in
heterogeneity, the estimated factor loadings end up reflecting the net effect of these two forces.
In extended model 2, which separates the two forces, the factor loadings are freed up to reflect
only the rapid rise in returns to skill.
In Figure 10, we depict the extended model's implications for the decomposition of
inequality into its persistent and transitory components. The figure portrays the net effects of the
two opposing forces in persistent inequality. That is, as new cohorts arrive at age 40, we allow
both the persistent factor loadings to increase and a, to decrease. The figure is fairly similar to
Figure 5forthe base model, but despite the greater homogeneity of the more recent cohorts,
Figure 10 shows an even greater role for the persistent component in accounting for the increase
35in overall earnings inequality. This is formalized in the time-series regressions in Table 6.
Compared to the base model, extended model 2 shows a larger estimated trend coefficient for the
persistent component and a smaller one for the transitory component. We see even greater
dissimilarity in comparisons of the extended model to the restricted models estimated in Table 7.
The restricted models' understatement of the role of the persistent component in rising inequality
and exaggeration of the role of the transitory component are accentuated in comparison to
extended model 2.
Would further experimentation lead to still more changes in inference? We have explored
two extensions of extended model 2 and found that our results are not sensitive in these
dimensions. The first extension is to specify cohort-specific parameters for the entire age profile
of the persistent component, restricting the profile to be linear to keep the model manageable.
This is just a simple extension of the argument that led to the cohort-specific estimates of o.
Thesecond is to specify separate factor loadings on the random-walk portion of the persistent
component. The argument here is that the sorts of events that lead to unit roots in earnings are
very different from the human capital investments that lead to heterogeneous growth rates, and
the evolution of these two types of effects over the 1980's might be different. The trend
decompositions for these models, however, turn out to be very similar to the decomposition for
extended model 2. In each case, the persistent component still makes the larger contribution to
the upward trend in inequality.31
31 The parameter estimates for these models are available from the authors on request. For the model with cohort-
specific age profiles in the persistent component, time-series regressions (as in table 6) lead to estimated time trend
coefficients of 0.0043 (0.0009) for the persistent component and 0.0013 (0.0004) for the transitory component.
The corresponding estimates for the model with the separate factor loading on the random walk are 0.003 8
(0.0005) and 0.0018 (0.0005) respectively. The factor loadings on the random walk do display a different pattern
than the loadings on the age profile of the persistent component. They decline in recessions, peak in expansions,
36To summarize, our results indicate that Canada's increase in earnings inequality has
stemmed from increases in both the persistent and transitory components of earnings variation.
The results from our preferred models suggest that the persistent component has played at least a
somewhat larger role. This means that, to an important extent, the growth in cross-sectional
inequality reflects a widened gap between the chronic haves and the chronic have-nots. Our
results contrast somewhat with the U.S. literature, which has concluded that increases in the
persistent and transitory components have been about equally important. This contrast seems
anomalous at first because the returns to education have increased less in Canada than in the
United States. Our specification analyses, however, reveal that the contrast may be at least partly
an artifact of specification errors in the U.S. literature. When we use our Canadian data to test
the restrictions imposed in the U.S. literature, we reject the restrictions. We also fmd that
imposing these evidently false restrictions shifts the decomposition of the increase in earnings
inequality towards the transitory component.
V. Conclusions
Using an extraordinary data set drawn from longitudinal income tax records, we have
verified that earnings inequality in Canada grew substantially over our sample period of 1976-
1992, and we have decomposed this growth in inequality into its persistent and transitory
components. Like some of the U.S. studies cited in our introduction, we have found that the rise
in inequality has stemmed from upward trends in both components. Thus, Canada's growth in
annual earnings inequality signifies an increase in long-run inequality, as well as an increase in
and range between 0.93 and 1.17. The estimated factor loadings for the age profile of the persistent component are
very similar to those reported for extended model 2.
37earnings instability. Our estimates from our preferred models suggest that the increase in the
persistent component may have played a somewhat larger role.
What has caused the increases in both long-run inequality and instability is an important
subject for continuing research. In the U.S. studies, the fmding of increased persistent inequality
was expected because the United States has experienced a large increase in the return to
schooling. This increase has been thoroughly documented and has been attributed in large part to
skill-biased technological change that has increased the relative demand for educated labor.32 In
Canada, however, there has been little increase in the return to education, so it was less clear
whether Canada's increase in annual earnings inequality reflects a rise in long-run inequality.
Now that we have found that it does, it is natural to ask why long-run inequality has increased in
Canada without much increase in the return to schooling. Freeman and Needels (1993)
conjecture that the wage impact of increased relative demand for educated labor has been offset in
Canada by a dramatic increase in the supply of college-educated labor. If other skifi attributes
(e.g., intelligence) have not undergone similar increases in supply, though, skill-biased
technological change could still increase the returns to those skills. Perhaps this is why the
persistent component of earnings inequality has increased in Canada despite little change in the
return to schooling.
The increase in earnings instability is even more puzzling, both in the United States and
Canada. While the U.S. literature has intensively studied the increased return to schooling, it has
just begun to speculate about the sources of rising volatility in earnings. (3ottschalk and Moffitt
(1994), as well as their discussants, do discuss various possible explanations for the U.S. increase
32 DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), however, stress that changes in unionization and the relative minimum
wage also have contributed to the rise in wage inequality.
38in earnings instability, but they conclude, "We have not located any defmitive explanation for the
increased transitory variance." For example, they consider whether the large decline in the
unionization of the U.S. work force has played an important role, but they fmd this could be "only
a small part of the explanation." In Canada, de-unionization is even less promising as an
explanation because union density has not declined nearly as much there as in the United States
(Riddell, 1993).
Another possible source of increased earnings instability is a decline in job stability. The
U.S. evidence, however, does not point to a clear-cut trend in that direction.33 Similarly, the two
Canadian studies of which we are aware --Heisz(1996) and Green and Riddell (1997) --donot
fmd a broad trend toward shorter job duration, but instead fmd an increasing prevalence of both
very short and very long jobs. Whether this polarization in the job tenure distribution can possibly
explain much of Canada's increase in earnings instability probably deserves some attention.34
Another possible factor, which seems to have been overlooked so far in the literature, is
tax changes that have altered the incentives for income smoothing.35 As detailed in Shoven and
Whalley (1992), both Canada and the United States adopted a complex series of tax changes
during the 1980's. While some of these changes (such as the flattening of marginal tax rates) may
have increased earnings volatility by reducing incentives for income smoothing, others (such as
Canada's elimination of income averaging) cut in the other direction. As in the case of changes in
the distribution of job tenure, the impact on earnings instability is not immediately obvious, but
probably warrants further research.
See Jaeger and Stevens (1998) and the references therein.
Another empirical question relevant to this issue is whether the increased instability in annual earnings stems
from increased instability in annual work hours or in hourly wages. Unfortunately, our data set does not permit a
decomposition of annual earnings into its hours and wage components.
39The substantive focus of our paper has been on learning more (and raising additional
questions) about the sources of Canada's increase in earnings inequality. Along the way,
however, we also have tried to push the econometric envelope in the modeling of earnings
dynamics. Thanks to the large size of our earnings panel, we have had the opportunity to estimate
more general models than could be identified in previous research on earnings mobility.
For example, several recent studies have modeled the fanning out of a cohort's earnings
distribution over the life cycle with either heterogeneous earnings growth or a random walk, but
limited sample sizes have prevented these studies from incorporating both in the same model. We
have succeeded in estimating the parameters of both of these aspects of the earnings process, and
we have found that both are significant. This is a reassuring fmding because there are good
economic reasons to expect both aspects to be present. Persistent differences across individuals
in their intensity of human capital investment, for example, ought to lead to heterogeneity in
earnings growth.36 Job losses and other shocks that cause permanent earnings changes ought to
generate a random-walk aspect in the earnings process. In addition, we have found that the
volatility of transitory earnings innovations varies significantly with stage of the life cycle. When
researchers specify models that arbitrarily rule out some of these factors, they run the risk of
falsely attributing some of the nonstationarity apparent in earnings data to only those sources of
nonstationarity that remain in their models.
The practical importance of these modeling choices is ifiustrated by our experiments with
imposing restrictions commonly found in the U.S. literature on earnings dynamics and inequality
"Wethank Joel Slemrod for raising this possibility and Jack Mintz for discussing it withus.
36Ittherefore is surprising that Abowd and Card's (1989)influentialstudy claims an "absence of any permanent
individual components of variance in the rate of growth of earnings or hours." As explained in Baker (1997),
Abowd and Card fail to detect the heterogeneity of earnings growth because their samples are small and because
they view the data only in first differences.
40trends. Not only do our data reject many of these restrictions, but imposing these apparently false
restrictions sometimes generates important changes in substantive results. For example, we fmd
with our data that imposing Moffitt and Gottschalk's (1995) restrictions of no heterogeneity in
earnings growth rates and no age-related heteroskedasticity in transitory innovations ascribes a
much larger share of the increase in earnings inequality to the transitory component. This raises
the possibility that some of the findings in the U.S. literature have been distorted by the modeling
restrictions necessitated by reliance on relatively small-scale panel surveys. Of course, the
happiest response to this possibility would be to acquire better U.S. data that would enable
estimation of less restrictive models. Until such time as that becomes possible, researchers need
to be cognizant of the possible sensitivity of their results to arbitrary modeling choices, and they
need to conduct and report checks of the robustness of their results across alternative
specffications.
41Append
The variables capturing education differ somewhat across the 1976, 1981 and 1986 Canadian
censuses. In the 1981 and 1986 censuses, some years of primary and secondary education are
reported in ranges, and greater detail on years of post-secondary education is available. To
construct a variable that is consistent across censuses, we measure years of education as the sum
of years of primary/secondary, years of post-secondary university, and years of post-secondary
non-university. Years of primary/secondary can take on the values 2, 6, and 9 through 13. Years
of post-secondary university can take on the values 0 through 6. Years of post-secondary non-
university can take on the values 0 through 3.
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47Table 1: Cohorts included in the Working Sample
Birth Year Sample Size Years Observed Age in Initial Year
1924/25 1219 1976-1982 52
1926/27 1272 1976-1984 50
1928/29 1170 1976-1986 48
1930/31 1054 1976-1988 46
1932/33 1013 1976-1990 44
1934/35 877 1976-1992 42
1936/37 1052 1976-1992 40
1938/39 1275 1976-1992 38
1940/41 1364 1976-1992 36
1942/43 1547 1976-1992 34
1944/45 1662 1976-1992 32
1946/47 2034 1976-1992 30
1948/49 1918 1976-1992 28
1950/51 1870 1976-1992 26
1952/53 2129 1978-1992 26
1954/55 2326 1980-1992 26
1956/57 2500 1982-1992 26
1958/59 2774 1984-1992 26
1960/61 3049 1986-1992 26
Total 32,105
Notes: Source- Revenue Canada T-4 Supplementary Tax File. Age is defmed by the older
of the birth cohorts in each two year cohort.Table 2: The Variance of Log Earnings in Various Samples
Year Analysis Analysis Sample Individuals withIndividuals Aged 25-58
Sample Positive Earnings andwith Positive Earnings
Ages Analysis Sample Ages
N Var(y) N Var(y) N Var(y)
1976 25-52 19327 0.270 36789 0.597 41654 0.601
1977 26-53 19327 0.268 36235 0.614 42190 0.630
1978 25-54 21456 0.290 39539 0.629 42808 0.630
1979 26-55 21456 0.254 39592 0.603 44117 0.616
1980 25-56 23782 0.291 43484 0.644 45051 0.646
1981 26-57 23782 0.285 43332 0.647 46211 0.658
1982 25-58 26282 0.382 46325 0.745 46325 0.745
1983 26-57 25063 0.391 44006 0.772 46899 0.791
1984 25-58 27837 0.407 47855 0.798 47855 0.798
1985 26-57 26565 0.370 46119 0.777 49195 0.790
1986 25-58 29614 0.407 50286 0.790 50286 0.790
1987 26-57 28444 0.363 48599 0.766 51576 0.781
1988 27-58 28444 0.348 48611 0.765 53080 0.784
1989 28-57 27390 0.336 47037 0.765 54577 0.785
1990 29-58 27390 0.353 46489 0.768 55231 0.790
1991 30-57 26377 0.412 43618 0.815 54720 0.857
1992 31-58 26377 0.457 42231 0.846 54038 0.889
Notes:Source- Revenue Canada T-4 Supplementary Tax File.Table 3: The Autocovariances, Cb, ofthe Log Earnings Residuals for the 1926/27 and
1958/59 Birth Cohorts
Cohort Born1926/1927
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
1976 0.287
(0.023)
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1984 0.526
(0.022)


































































































Notes: Source- Revenue Canada T-4 Supplementary Tax File. Standard error estimates are in
parentheses. Correlation coefficients are reported above the diagonal.Table 4: The Autocovariances, C,,, ofthe Log Earnings Residuals for the 1942/43
Birth Cohort
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
1976 0.225 0.807 0.675 0.633 0.636 0.577 0.572 0.528 0.547
(0.017)
19770.178 0.216 0.783 0.694 0.695 0.633 0.623 0.560 0.578
(0.013)(0.019)
19780.157 0.178 0.241 0.779 0.732 0.665 0.648 0.609 0,619
(0.010)(0.012)(0.018)
19790.148 0.159 0.188 0.242 0.772 0.674 0.640 0.586 0.580
(0.011)(0.011)(0.012)(0.021)
19800,145 0.155 0.173 0.183 0.231 0.794 0.700 0.652 0.628
(0.010)(0.010)(0.012)(0.012)(0.017)
19810.140 0.150 0.167 0.169 0.195 0.261 0.757 0.674 0.646
(0.009)(0.010)(0.010)(0.011)(0.014)(0.022)
19820.156 0.166 0.182 0.180 0.193 0.221 0.328 0.778 0.699
(0.010)(0.013)(0.012)(0.011)(0.012)(0.016)(0.025)
19830.149 0.154 0.177 0.171 0.186 0.204 0.264 0.351 0.781
(0.011)(0.010)(0.013)(0.012)(0.012)(0.015)(0.017)(0.026)
1984 0.151 0.156 0.176 0.166 0.175 0.192 0.233 0.269 0.338
(0.012)(0.011)(0.013)(0.011)(0.012)(0.013)(0.015)(0.019)(0.027)
19850.146 0.147 0.169 0.169 0.177 0.185 0.221 0.238 0.253
(0.009)(0.010)(0.012) (0.012)(0.012)(0.012)(0.013)(0.014)(0.016)
19860.140 0.140 0.160 0.159 0.166 0.177 0.209 0.218 0.227
(0.009)(0.009)(0.010)(0.011)(0.011)(0.011)(0.013)(0.013)(0.014)
19870.139 0.146 0.165 0.160 0.165 0.174 0.203 0.213 0.224
(0.009)(0.010)(0.012)(0.011)(0.012)(0.011)(0.013)(0.015)(0.015)
1988 0.137 0.142 0.160 0.159 0.167 0.173 0.200 0.201 0.213
(0.009)(0.010)(0.011)(0.011)(0.012)(0.012)(0.013)(0.013)(0.014)
1989 0.135 0.139 0.155 0.154 0.159 0.172 0.201 0.203 0.208
(0.009)(0.010)(0.011)(0.011)(0.011)(0.013)(0.013)(0.014)(0.014)
1990 0.132 0.133 0.150 0.149 0.151 0.161 0.194 0.199 0.203
(0.010)(0.010)(0.011)(0.012)(0.011)(0.011)(0.013)(0.014) (0.014)
19910.129 0.136 0.148 0.151 0.153 0.165 0.211 0.201 0.208
(0.009)(0.010)(0.010)(0.011)(0.010)(0.011)(0.014)(0.013) (0.013)
1992 0.135 0.136 0.153 0.147 0.155 0.168 0.216 0.209 0.211
(0.009)(0.010)(0.011)(0.010)(0.011)(0.011)(0.015)(0.015)(0.013)
Notes:Source- Revenue Canada T-4 Supplementary Tax File. Standard error estimates
are in parentheses. Correlation coefficients are reported above the diagonal.Table 4: (cont.)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
1976 0.577 0.568 0.549 0.517 0.516 0.494 0.464 0.433
1977 0.596 0.578 0.590 0.547 0.540 0.510 0.497 0.446
1978 0.647 0.628 0.632 0.584 0.571 0.546 0.512 0.473
1979 0.647 0.623 0.610 0.580 0.568 0.541 0.523 0.455
1980 0.690 0.663 0.644 0.623 0.598 0.560 0.540 0.490
1981 0.681 0.667 0.641 0.607 0.610 0.563 0.552 0.501
1982 0.726 0.702 0.666 0.625 0.635 0.604 0.627 0.573
1983 0.755 0.708 0.674 0.608 0.618 0.599 0.576 0.537
1984 0.818 0.752 0.725 0.657 0.646 0.623 0.610 0.552
1985 0.283 0.848 0.793 0.723 0.717 0.676 0.637 0.598
(0.020)
1986 0.235 0.271 0.851 0.749 0.755 0.709 0.669 0.597
(0.014) (0.017)
1987 0.225 0.236 0.284 0.827 0.766 0.712 0.690 0.612
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020)
1988 0.215 0.218 0.246 0.312 0.825 0.752 0.701 0.632
(0.014)(0.014)(0.017)(0.025)
1989 0.211 0.217 0.226 0.255 0.306 0.831 0.739 0.668
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.024)
1990 0.202 0.207 0.213 0.236 0.258 0.315 0.799 0.697
(0.014)(0.014)(0.015)(0.016)(0.017)(0.021)
1991 0.199 0.205 0.216 0.230 0.240 0.263 0.345 0.789
(0.012)(0.013)(0.015)(0.015)(0.015)(0.017)(0.024)
1992 0.209 0.204 0.214 0.232 0.243 0.257 0.305 0.433
(0.014)(0.013)(0.014)(0.015)(0.015)(0.017)(0.019)(0.033)Table 5: Estimates of Earnings Dynamics Models
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Notes: Source --RevenueCanada T-4 Supplementary Tax File.Table 5: (cont.)































0.038 0.139 0.039 0.108 0.020
a612, 0.084 0.03 1 0.088 0.032 0.076 0.025
a8j2g 0.116 0.033 0.120 0.033 0.112 0.023
a013, 0.071 0.029 0.075 0.030 0.084 0.023
a2133 0.071 0.027 0.075 0.024 0.119 0.021
a4135 0.127 0.040 0.131 0.040 0.092 0.022
a5137 0.085 0.029 0.088 0.030 0.077 0.024
8/39 0.044 0.025 0.046 0.026 0.061 0.018
c014, 0.066 0.025 0.068 0.026 0.086 0.019
a2143 0.074 0.023 0.076 0.024 0.094 0.020
a4145 0.054 0.025 0.057 0.026 0.075 0.019
a6147 0.071 0.021 0.075 0.021 0.116 0.019
a8149 0.090 0.022 0.097 0.022 0.147 0.019
a015, 0.167 0.024 0.178 0.024 0.206 0.022Table 5: (cont.)
Estimate











































0.011 0.556 0.012 0.476 0.010
0.011 0.095 0.010 0.159 0.012
0.002 -0.006 0.001 -0.023 0.003
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0020 0.0004
2.49E-065.06E-071.75E-06-7.98E-051.81E-05
1.43E-083.1OE-09144E-081.17E-062.79E-07
A77 1.000 1.000 1.000
1.132 0.060 1.122 0.058 1.067 0.042
A79 0.950 0.051 0.944 0.049 0.909 0.037
A80 1.060 0.061 1.052 0.058 0.991 0.041
'81 1.066 0.062 1.052 0.060 0.974 0.041
A82 1.397 0.079 1.381 0.077 1.236 0.049
)3 1.527 0.085 1.503 0.079 1.316 0.050
A 1.379 0.080 1.357 0.076 1.211 0.048
A85 1.343 0.077 1.318 0.071 1.138 0.046
'86 1.339 0.078 1.320 0.074 1.152 0.046
'87 1.304 0.076 1.287 0.072 1.070 0,044
A88 1.285 0.074 1.273 0.071 1.042 0.045
A89 1.260 0.076 1.249 0.073 1.003 0.047
A90 1.405 0.080 1.394 0.077 1.122 0.054
A91 1.513 0.087 1.498 0.083 1.271 0.066













































































Notes: The coefficient estimates come from ordinary least squares estimation of
regressions in which the dependent variable is the estimated persistent or transitory
component (for a male aged 40) from the indicated model and the explanatory variables
are the unemployment rate and a linear time trend variable. The sample period is 1976-


























































1.023 0.013 1.031 0.012
1.010 0.017 1.018 0.015
0.986 0.018 1.008 0.016
1.013 0.021 1.041 0.018
1.042 0.023 1,082 0.020
1.147 0.029 1.194 0.025
1.112 0.030 1.182 0.026
1.117 0.031 1.185 0.026
1.104 0.030 1.188 0.026
1.091 0.031 1.165 0.026
1.061 0.031 1.140 0.027
1.071 0.031 1.139 0.028
1.086 0.032 1.153 0.028
1.098 0.031 1.151 0.028









































0.172 0.044 0.182 0.042
0.109 0.036 0.128 0.033
0.125 0.039 0.160 0.037
0.076 0.034 0.117 0.032
0.063 0.031 0.116 0.029
0.136 0.042 0.179 0.041
0.083 0.032 0.130 0.030
Notes: Source --RevenueCanada T-4 Supplementary Tax File.Table 7 (cont.)








































0.027 0.072 0.028 0.105 0.027
0.025 0.088 0.026 0.108 0.025
0.030 0.077 0.031 0.082 0.029
0.021 0.088 0.021 0.084 0.022
0.023 0.106 0.022 0.089 0.023
0.023 0.195 0.022 0.154 0.025
0.025 0.190 0.023 0.144 0.025
0.027 0.190 0.023 0.237 0.027
0.028 0.292 0.026 0.288 0.028
0.027 0.360 0.026 0.351 0.028
0.025 0.413 0.025 0.366 0.026





























































































































0.053Table 8: WaId Tests of Model Restrictions.
Model Restriction x2 Degrees of
Freedom
P-value
Base Model = a26127== °6O/6I 380.584 18 0.0000
71 =0,72= 0,=0,=0 94.630 4 0.0000
a=O,a=O 54.661 2 0.0000
Extended
Model 1 a=O,a,=O,ci,=O 6.189 3 0.1028
Extended
Model 2








Notes: Source --RevenueCanada T-4 Supplementary Tax File.Table 9: The Variance of Years of Education by Cohort
Census 1976 1981 1986 o
Cohort
1924/25 18.784 19.510 0.266
1926/27 16.909 18.353 0.245
1928/29 17.606 17.690 18.413 0.227
1930/31 17.682 18.182 18.131 0.203
1932/33 17.598 17.464 18.267 0.171
1934/35 18.327 17.581 17.447 0.201
1936/37 18.122 17.884 17.322 0.177
1938/39 17.539 17.057 17.564 0.157
1940/41 17.198 17.057 17.032 0.147
1942/43 15.571 16.966 16.322 0.142
1944/45 15.832 15.904 15.351 0.137
1946/47 13.638 15.171 13.506 0.121
1948/49 12.881 13.786 12.709 0.110
1950/51 11.290 13.061 11.553 0.113
1952/53 11.567 10.699 0.108
1954/55 9.960 9.622 0.107
1956/57 8.970 9.000 0.104
1958/59 8.538 0.101
1960/61 8.214 0.106
Correlation 0.821 0.834 0.850
with o
Notes: Source --1976,1981 and 1986 Canadian censuses. Sample --menwho worked in
the reference week. Cohort specific estimates of cr are from extended model 2 in Table
5.F
i
g
u
r
e
 
1
:
 
T
h
e
 
V
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
L
o
g
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
i
n
 
V
a
r
i
o
u
s
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
s
 
1
.
0
0
0
 
0
.
9
0
0
 
p
 
•
 
—
 
0
.
8
0
0
 
-
 
.
,
-
.
-
.
.
.
.
 
•
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
0
.
7
0
0
 
-
 
—
.
—
.
-
-
-
 
.
.
:
-
 
0
6
0
0
•
 
-
.
_
-
 
—
 
—
 
—
 
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
a
n
d
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
0
.
5
0
0
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
A
g
e
s
 
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
 
A
g
e
d
 
2
5
-
5
8
 
w
i
t
h
 
0
.
4
0
0
 
0
.
3
0
0
 
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
0
.
2
0
0
 
0
.
1
0
0
 
0
.
0
0
0
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
1
9
7
6
 
1
9
7
7
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
7
9
 
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
1
 
1
9
8
2
 
1
9
8
3
 
1
9
8
4
 
1
9
8
5
 
1
9
8
6
 
1
9
8
7
 
1
9
8
8
 
1
9
8
9
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
1
 
1
9
9
2
 
Y
e
a
r
 
N
o
t
e
:
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
-
-
 
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
C
a
n
a
d
a
 
T
-
4
 
S
u
p
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
r
y
 
T
a
x
 
F
i
l
e
.
 
S
e
e
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
2
.
 0
.
9
8
 
0
.
9
6
 
0
.
9
4
 
0
.
9
2
 
1
9
7
6
 
1
9
7
7
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
7
9
 
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
1
 
1
9
8
2
 
1
9
8
3
 
1
9
8
4
 
1
9
8
5
 
1
9
8
6
 
1
9
8
7
 
1
9
8
8
 
1
9
8
9
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
1
 
1
9
9
2
 
Y
e
a
r
 
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
-
-
 
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
C
a
n
a
d
a
 
T
-
4
 
S
u
p
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
r
y
 
T
a
x
 
F
i
l
e
.
 
M
e
a
n
 
L
o
g
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
a
g
e
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
i
s
 
n
o
r
m
a
l
i
z
e
d
 
t
o
 
e
q
u
a
l
 
1
.
0
 
i
n
 
1
9
7
9
.
 
1
.
1
 
1
 
0
8
 
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
2
:
 
T
h
e
 
M
e
a
n
 
o
f
 
L
o
g
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
b
y
 
A
g
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
1
.
0
6
 
1
.
0
4
 
1
.
0
2
 
1
 
—
.
—
A
g
e
s
 
2
6
-
3
0
 
—
.
—
A
g
e
s
 
3
1
-
3
5
 
—
*
-
-
 
A
g
e
s
 
3
6
-
4
0
 
—
-
-
A
g
e
s
 
4
1
-
4
5
 
-
—
 
A
g
e
s
 
4
6
-
5
0
 
—
.
—
A
g
e
s
 
5
1
-
5
5
 F
i
g
u
r
e
 
3
:
 
T
h
e
 
V
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
L
o
g
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
b
y
 
A
g
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
1
9
8
1
 
1
9
8
2
 
1
9
8
3
 
1
9
8
4
 
1
9
8
5
 
1
9
8
6
 
1
9
8
7
 
1
9
8
8
 
1
9
8
9
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
1
 
1
9
9
2
 
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
-
-
 
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
C
a
n
a
d
a
 
T
-
4
 
S
u
p
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
r
y
 
T
a
x
 
F
i
l
e
.
 
T
h
e
 
v
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
l
o
g
 
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
a
g
e
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
i
s
 
n
o
r
m
a
l
i
z
e
d
 
t
o
 
e
q
u
a
l
 
1
.
0
 
i
n
 
1
9
7
9
.
 
2
.
5
 
2
 
1
.
5
 
1
 
0
.
5
 
—
.
—
 
A
g
e
s
 
2
6
-
3
0
 
—
u
—
A
g
e
s
 
3
1
-
3
5
 
—
a
—
 
A
g
e
s
 
3
6
-
4
0
 
—
'
f
—
A
g
e
s
 
4
1
-
4
5
 
—
*
-
-
-
 
A
g
e
s
 
4
6
-
5
0
 
—
.
—
A
g
e
s
 
5
1
-
5
5
 
0
 
1
9
7
6
 
1
9
7
7
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
7
9
 
1
9
8
0
 
Y
e
a
r
 0
.
1
 
0
.
0
9
 
-
 
0
.
0
8
 
-
 
0
.
0
7
 
0
.
0
6
 
-
 
0
.
0
5
 
-
 
0
.
0
4
 
-
 
0
.
0
3
 
-
 
0
.
0
2
 
-
 
0
.
0
1
 
0
 
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
4
:
 
T
h
e
 
A
g
e
 
P
r
o
f
i
l
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
V
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
T
r
a
n
s
i
t
o
r
y
 
I
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
B
a
s
e
 
M
o
d
e
l
 
N
o
t
e
:
 
T
h
e
 
a
g
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
l
e
 
i
s
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
s
e
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
i
n
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
5
.
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
1
 
—
 
0
 
C
J
 
(
0
 
0
 
C
M
 
(
0
 
a
D
 
0
 
C
M
 
(
0
 
a
D
 
C
M
 
(
'
1
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
C
O
 
C
O
 
C
O
 
-
 
-
 
-
 
L
I
)
 
I
C
)
 
I
C
)
 
U
)
 
U
)
 
A
g
e
 0
.
4
5
0
 
-
 
0
.
4
0
0
 
-
 
0
.
3
5
0
 
-
 
0
.
3
0
0
 
-
 
0
.
2
5
0
 
-
 
0
.
2
0
0
 
-
 
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
5
:
 
A
 
D
e
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
V
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
L
o
g
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
f
o
r
 
M
a
l
e
s
,
 
4
0
 
Y
e
a
r
s
 
O
l
d
:
 
B
a
s
e
 
M
o
d
e
l
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
(
C
)
 
N
-
 
)
 
0
)
 
0
 
'
-
 
c
'
J
 
C
)
 
I
t
)
 
(
0
 
N
-
 
a
)
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
.
-
 
C
%
J
 
N
-
 
N
-
 
N
-
 
N
-
 
a
)
 
a
)
 
a
)
 
C
)
 
C
X
)
 
a
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
a
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
C
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
C
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
C
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
C
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
r
 
r
 
.
-
 
i
-
 
r
 
r
 
r
 
1
 
r
 
r
 
r
 
r
 
r
 
Y
e
a
r
 
0
.
1
5
0
-
 
0
.
1
0
0
 
-
 
0
.
0
5
0
 
-
 
0
.
0
0
0
 
-
 
—
+
—
—
 
P
e
r
s
i
s
t
e
n
t
 
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
 
—
U
—
T
r
a
n
s
i
t
o
r
y
 
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
 
N
o
t
e
:
 
T
h
e
 
d
e
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
s
e
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
5
.
 F
i
g
u
r
e
 
6
:
 
A
 
D
e
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
V
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
L
o
g
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
f
o
r
 
M
a
l
e
s
,
 
4
0
 
Y
e
a
r
s
 
O
l
d
:
 
R
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
 
M
o
d
e
l
 
1
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
(
0
 
N
 
a
)
 
0
)
 
0
 
'
 
C
'
J
 
0
)
 
L
U
 
(
0
 
N
 
(
0
 
0
)
 
0
 
'
—
 
(
'
J
 
N
-
 
N
 
N
 
N
-
 
(
0
 
(
0
 
(
0
 
(
0
 
(
0
 
a
)
 
a
)
 
a
)
 
(
0
 
(
0
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
,
-
 
,
-
 
,
-
 
.
-
 
,
-
 
'
I
-
 
7
-
 
7
-
 
,
-
 
7
-
 
7
-
 
-
 
7
-
 
7
-
 
,
-
 
Y
e
a
r
 
0
.
4
5
0
 
0
.
4
0
0
 
0
.
3
5
0
'
 
0
.
3
0
0
 
0
.
2
5
0
 
-
 
0
.
2
0
0
 
-
 
0
.
1
5
0
-
 
0
.
1
0
0
 
-
 
0
.
0
5
0
 
-
 
0
.
0
0
0
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
—
.
—
 
P
e
r
s
i
s
t
e
n
t
 
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
 
—
U
—
 
T
r
a
n
s
i
t
o
i
y
 
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
 
•
-
-
-
-
 
S
u
m
 
N
o
t
e
:
 
T
h
e
 
d
e
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
1
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
7
.
 F
i
g
u
r
e
 
7
:
 
A
 
D
e
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
V
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
L
o
g
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
f
o
r
 
M
a
l
e
s
,
 
4
0
 
Y
e
a
r
 
O
l
d
s
:
 
R
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
 
M
o
d
e
l
 
2
 
(
0
 
N
—
 
0
)
 
0
 
'
—
 
C
'
J
 
C
)
 
U
)
 
(
0
 
N
-
 
0
)
 
0
 
-
 
C
'
J
 
N
-
 
N
-
 
N
-
 
N
-
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
0
)
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
C
)
 
0
)
 
r
 
r
 
r
'
 
,
-
 
r
 
r
 
-
 
¶
-
 
r
 
r
 
r
 
r
 
r
 
r
-
 
r
 
r
 
,
-
 
Y
e
a
r
 
0
.
4
5
0
 
-
 
0
.
4
0
0
 
-
 
0
.
3
5
0
 
0
.
3
0
0
 
-
 
0
.
2
5
0
 
-
.
 
0
.
2
0
0
-
-
 
0
.
1
5
0
 
-
.
 
0
.
1
0
0
 
-
 
0
.
0
5
0
 
-
 
-
 
0
.
0
0
0
 
-
 
—
.
-
-
 
P
e
r
s
i
s
t
e
n
t
 
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
 
—
u
—
T
r
a
n
s
i
t
o
r
y
 
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
 
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
T
h
e
 
d
e
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
2
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
7
.
 F
i
g
u
r
e
 
8
:
 
A
 
D
e
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
V
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
L
o
g
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
f
o
r
 
M
a
l
e
s
,
 
4
0
 
Y
e
a
r
s
 
O
l
d
,
 
R
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
 
M
o
d
e
l
 
3
 
0
.
0
0
0
 
O
 
N
-
 
0
)
 
0
 
C
'
J
 
C
)
 
N
-
 
N
-
 
N
-
 
N
-
 
C
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
-
 
Y
l
a
r
 
0
 
(
0
 
N
-
 
0
)
 
0
 
0
.
1
 
(
0
 
(
0
 
0
)
 
(
0
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
T
h
e
 
d
e
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
3
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
7
.
 
0
.
4
5
0
 
0
.
4
0
0
 
0
.
3
5
0
 
0
.
3
0
0
 
0
.
2
5
0
 
0
.
2
0
0
-
•
 
0
.
1
5
0
•
•
 
0
.
1
0
0
 
0
.
0
5
0
 
-
 
—
$
-
—
 
P
e
r
s
i
s
t
e
n
t
 
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
 
—
—
 
T
r
a
n
s
i
t
o
r
y
 
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
 
—
*
—
S
u
m
 0
.
1
8
 
0
.
1
6
 
-
 
0
.
1
4
 
-
 
0
.
1
2
 
-
 
0
.
1
 
0
.
0
8
 
-
 
0
.
0
6
 
-
 
0
.
0
4
 
-
 
0
.
0
2
 
-
 
0
 
F
i
g
u
r
e
 
9
:
 
T
h
e
 
A
g
e
 
P
r
o
f
i
l
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
V
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
T
r
a
n
s
i
t
o
r
y
 
I
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
E
x
t
e
n
d
e
d
 
M
o
d
e
l
 
2
 
N
o
t
e
:
 
T
h
e
 
a
g
e
 
p
r
o
f
i
l
e
 
i
s
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
x
t
e
n
d
e
d
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
2
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
5
.
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
1
 
I
 
(
0
 
0
 
C
'
J
 
(
0
 
(
0
 
0
 
C
'
J
 
(
0
 
(
0
 
0
 
(
0
 
(
0
 
C
J
 
(
N
 
C
'
)
 
C
'
)
 
C
'
)
 
C
'
)
 
C
'
)
 
-
 
1
4
)
 
I
C
)
 
U
)
 
(
0
 
I
C
)
 
A
g
e
 F
i
g
u
r
e
 
1
0
:
 
A
 
D
e
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
V
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
L
o
g
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
f
o
r
 
M
a
l
e
s
,
 
4
0
 
Y
e
a
r
s
 
O
l
d
:
 
E
x
t
e
n
d
e
d
 
M
o
d
e
l
 
2
 
—
•
—
 
P
e
r
s
i
s
t
e
n
t
 
C
o
m
p
p
n
e
n
t
 
—
*
—
 
T
r
a
n
s
t
t
o
r
y
 
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
 
N
o
t
e
:
 
T
h
e
 
d
e
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
x
t
e
n
d
e
d
 
m
o
d
e
l
 
2
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
5
.
 
0
.
4
5
0
 
0
.
4
0
0
 
0
.
3
5
0
 
0
.
3
0
0
 
0
.
2
5
0
 
0
.
2
0
0
 
0
.
1
5
0
 
0
.
1
0
0
 
0
.
0
5
0
 
0
.
0
0
0
 
(
0
 
(
0
 
0
)
 
0
 
—
 
C
"
J
 
C
)
 
-
 
L
U
 
(
0
 
N
.
 
(
0
 
0
)
 
0
 
-
 
N
.
 
N
 
N
-
 
N
-
 
C
O
 
0
)
 
(
0
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
C
O
 
C
O
 
C
O
 
C
X
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
0
)
 
1
 
r
 
r
 
r
 
r
 
r
 
r
 
r
 
-
 
,
 
r
 
1
 
Y
e
a
r
 